

Designer's Notes

How'd the bus get to this stop anyway?

BCS was a long time in gestation. Many a playtester's printer, and much of the forests of South America, went to the great beyond trying to keep up. But what was the origin of this effort?

Well, in the beginning it was envisioned as nothing more than a "Battalion-level *OCS*" adaptation. A change of scale—only—allowing for smaller units and battles. Nothing to it, I thought. Yeah, right.

It wasn't long into the work that it left the *OCS* far behind (battalion level is *much more* than the operational level system could show, even with smaller units). I wanted to do battalion level *right* and show the player things that other systems just didn't bother doing—primarily because they continued on to where the road I started on would have led: taking fundamentally operational rules sets and shoe-horning them into the smaller scale.

That started a very wild ride.

The Big ideas

If I may be so bold, I think I've come up with a few ideas of note in my 25 or so years of professional design work. Each caused a stir when released of "that just can't work" but each has stood the test of time in one way or another. Love them or hate them, they are what they are.

They are, I think, actual advances in the art of wargame design and my own small contribution to the effort to show warfare in a way that actually teaches the player something beyond just some "neat mechanics which are popular at the moment." I am quite proud of them.

These are: the written orders system in *CWB/RSS/NBS/LoB*, the graphic orders system in *TCS*, the surprise roll mechanic in *OCS*, and I'll dare to add... the Combat Trains & Traffic systems here in *BCS*.

In and amongst these big items are a slew of other things I'm proud of that don't rise to this level. Things such as the "Grail Games" (**DAK**, **Last Blitzkrieg**, and **Last Chance for Victory**),

the analysis of Gettysburg in **Last Chance for Victory**, the Boss Points system in **Karelia**, the victory system in **Heights of Courage**. But, these are not the same as the top tier concepts above.

So, how do things as "tiny" as Combat Trains or Traffic find its way into the same list as the various orders systems and the *OCS* surprise mechanic? It is the result of what they do and show.

Supply rules are, pretty much, a barren wasteland of design effort. Few care to even try and just slap in the standard "trace and you are good" mechanic on their way to the 'cool kid' mechanics like cards and chit pull. It's the red-headed step child of design work.

When it is looked at directly, designers might give it some attention in details such as the availability of Supply Points, maybe types of SPs, and the transportation of them. In all, this amounts to "if you have enough of the right kinds of stuff, you are good to go." Certainly, *OCS* made a career out of exactly that kind of decision making.

Even those games that attempted to go well **beyond** that which was reasonable for players to do (I'm looking at you, *Campaign for North Africa*) did so with an accountancy-based system of Supply Points of one sort or a dozen others and a boat-load of mechanics that allowed their use in various mixtures to get a specific end result (or not). But still, when stripped of all the Rube Goldberg sub-systems, if you had SPs, you could do whatever it was you were trying to pay to do. If you had X times the number of points needed, you could do that activity X times and so on.

Originally, *BCS* had a system that grafted over the *OCS* one. Players were given SPs (two kinds here—Ammo and Fuel) and literally paid for what they wanted to do. One twist I tried was to ignore the transportation of SPs on the map. There were no trucks. Rather, players issued SPs to the HQs (each of which had a "Lift" capability). You could give an HQ all you wanted, but if the HQ moved, it would bring only its Lift value along with it—the rest was destroyed and wasted. The idea was I was showing that the primary ingredient in logistics in warfare is *waste*. As one would expect, testers

reacted by placing only those SPs with the HQ which it could move to avoid losing any.

That effort became a drill of screwing over some formations so that others could live large. On top of that, fuel use payments were made behind the scenes so that only Ammo made it to the map anyway—and players were constantly finding literal limits to what they had available and balked at the restraints it put on them (especially when one of the “stripped” formations had to defend).

Historically, this became a problem as well. The Americans were flush enough that in most situations, I just assumed they had all they needed and they skipped logistics entirely.

The Germans could be given their points in one of two ways: a huge supply at start and a trickle coming in each turn (fairly accurate to what happened) or a smaller dump at start and a larger amount per turn.

Neither worked.

Both were crushed by the same accountancy mentality they promoted. If the Germans were given the huge dump, by putting “unwelcome” formations on a starvation diet, the “prime” units were never affected by supply shortages (and much of the army would not bother participating in the campaign). The smaller dump version didn’t allow the historical initial spasm of activity, and even then encouraged the starvation of the slow and the weak.

Along the way, the literal SPs gave way to the abstract LOG (what later became SNAFU) die roll which, forced some formations in some situations to do less than the player wanted. It got the job done, but was relegated so far into the background that logistics, as such, seemingly disappeared from the game.

We played on, refining the other systems in the game (bringing them, with the great and always insightful help of my dear friend **Rod Miller**, to an extraordinarily high level of polish and shine).

A certain level of unease started to settle in on me when I looked at the result. Recalling that I wanted *BCS* to show *something more*. *Something more* than down-scale operations, but also *something more* than the straight-forward level

of “ZOC-Bonking” seen in so many titles already. I began to wonder if *BCS* had lost a bit of its philosophic underpinnings and become something I started calling “*SCS* with Engagements.”

This led to an effort that spawned efforts at re-inserting the “something more” soul: OBJs, Traffic, and Combat Trains.

OBJs simply applied some of the player’s effort toward the planning of operations for a formation. They limit the number of different directions the formation could manage at one time and limit how well he could react to events as they unfolded.

Before, a formation could split up to the four winds to do any number of microscopic jobs all at once (or worse, execute what my son, John, did and run what I termed a “Bubble Offensive.”) None of those things looked anything like what the real formations could, or did, do—always an excellent tip-off that something isn’t right.

After some experimentation, the fairly straightforward OBJ marker placement system addressed these and numerous other issues. On top of that, I was able to dedicate a simple system allowing players to make use of the critical assets of these formations: the ability of some units to conduct recons of locations deeper than the at-start positions would allow.

Traffic came about later but addressed player concerns that while two Formations would interfere with each other via the Coordination rules, inside a given Formation, march congestion was never an issue. Now, players must carefully orchestrate their movements so as to avoid causing traffic blockages that will quite realistically jam up the movement of follow-up units. And even then, Murphy raises his ugly head when an attack clumsily ‘barely wins’ or a recon attempt trips over its shoes, each leading to a situation where something that shouldn’t be a problem ends up blocking the way.

At this time, logistics began to make a comeback into the system. Trains were added first, but were merely placeholders for the road net needed to operate the formation (leading to rules about ‘MSR Congestion’ which later converted into restrictions on coming back into ‘in Service’ and later ‘LOG Congestion’ which eventually

became ‘Optimal Distance’ and ‘Crossing the Streams’). These worked nicely and the players responded well to the planning and care needed to “do things right.”

Moving the trains results in them flipping to their ‘out of service’ (Ghost) side and inflicting a DRM on the formation’s LOG. Players reacted with care as to when to shift the trains around and when to wait. This was good, but something still seemed to be missing. That something is what elevated Combat Trains from a simple mechanic to *something more*.

It was the addition *Logistical Inertia* and *Supply without Accountants*.

But, ya gotta count them Points!!!

Trained by the games that even bothered about it, players learned to think of logistics like accountants. You have a pool of resources which are both quantified and discreet. You draw off them at some constant level for the actions you’d like to do and can repeat that process until you run out. When you run out you are done until you can get some more. Logistics was literally a matter of resource allocation and nothing deeper.

Cardboard units have no needs (or feelings) when you choose to not use them. So, you can deny formations all ammunition and fuel so that your favorites can make use of those points. Those stripped units will cheerfully await the end of the war, costing you nothing in the meantime, while they sit on their hands and watch.

Not much of that reflects reality.

Your resources are in a state of flux to an unknown degree. Errors exist in the inventory of what you have, spoilage is occurring, parts were mislabeled or put on trucks going to the wrong units, supplies you counted on get pilfered by units that thought they had more use for them than the ones you chose, all manner of things are making the clear cut become vague and unknowable—some of which are difficult to imagine—and all completely beyond your control.

Every activity has a cost, true, but the amount of the cost is only know in general terms and the planning figures can be thrown out the window

by unforeseen conditions, unit behaviors, and waste. What you thought should last for four days ends up being burned down in two while something else set up for four days seems to be lasting forever. And your best guess on hospital beds was simply wrong.

Inactive units still use food, fuel, and even ammunition. Troops have a bad habit of stealing from neighboring units (“They can make that good, right?”) and bulldozing dead vehicles off the road instead of sending them back for repair. Nobody knows what happened to the cases of ammo Private Snuffy was supposed to bring from the unit’s last position. Supply sergeants the world over maintain private stashes of material for trading purposes and ‘rainy’ days. “They asked for two of them? Grab three, you never know what might come up.” No unit is so inactive that it doesn’t continuously tap into your—still unknown—resources. Nor do they (and their commanders) react well to the idea of “you are going to be helpless while we send all the fuel to so-n-so.”

Ask Patton about that.

Yet, game supply systems invoke a world where the exact opposite is true in almost all of these points. Accountancy systems cannot help but measure with precision a system that has ‘precision’ in only the roughest terms. Accountancy rewards “just enough” thinking; real life revolves around pushing as much forward as you can, as fast as you can, and wait for the war to be won. You don’t know where “just enough” exists between “failure due to not enough” and “too much”... so you opt to risk too much.

The SNAFU (originally LOG) system by-passes the accountancy game. The typically player-driven main effort business is impossible to create (because you can’t). Predictive certainty in results “where it really, really matters” is illusive. The trucks might get stuck or not arrive at all—not based on where it is important, but like Mr. Murphy says, where it’ll probably hurt you the most. What’s available in the depot doesn’t translate into a discreet amount of activity on the map. Or, for that matter, a dip in depot reserves may or may not show up as a specific reduction. Eventually, as the Germans see in **Last Blitzkrieg**, their weak logistical system will give them an **overall** reduction in effectiveness—but the player will still not be

able to starve some units in order to keep his panzers gassed up.

Furthermore, without the ‘accountants gone wild’ method of supply, the player himself cannot say with certainty that formation X will do everything he needs them to do. The overall supply situation will produce a distribution of capabilities across the map that reflects itself, but the player can’t count on any given activation turning out for the best.

All of that brings logistics more into line with reality better than the more precise *looking* SP based system accomplishes.

One last point about prioritization, of course the real commanders can *try* to force scarce resources away from one sector so as to help out another. That’s not at issue. The problem with the game model is that such actions are taken as *standard behavior* and executed with a *ruthlessness* and *precision* that is simply impossible in real life. We all see this a lot in games. Players will ask me for a rule covering a certain action that a given unit did in a very special situation. No doubt—they really did it. Problem is, should I allow that action in the rules, players will use it frequently and in situations that are nowhere near as extreme as the reason it was done in real life. So, therefore I cannot allow the exception.

As time went on, the need to insert other items of friction, confusion, and outright failure into the ‘LOG’ system caused me to change the name to SNAFU. Logistics is (of course) still an important part of why units might not do all you ask of them—but so too are traffic control, command failures, and the myriad of other reasons all of which force ‘but it looks so easy on a map!’ into not translating into reality.

Inertia of what?

There are a couple levels of inertia built into Combat Trains.

Similarly, when the Trains are jumped by the enemy, the bounce either to the HQ (which brings its own inefficiencies) or off map (which brings bigger ones) creates less than optimal behavior on the part of the formation.

A smaller effect is when the Trains move and temporarily go “Out of Service” or into Ghost

mode. Once on their Ghost side the SNAFU problem can compound until you get your lines of communication straightened out. It’s reasonably mild, but can degrade sloppy play in favor of the player who takes the time to mitigate and minimize the effect.

The choice of when and where to move on the part of the player is a drag on his freedom of action. In a perfect world, he’d be able to shift the trains, right now, to where he needs them without the fuss of having them re-establishing themselves. If he chooses to shift too soon, he risks a hiccup in his logistical net. If he moves them too late (or not at all), he could find the speed of his operations degraded as the trains try to keep up and maybe can’t. In any event, we can count on Murphy making the worst possible thing happen at the worst possible time.

As with units tripping each other because of Traffic, rear area establishments (HQs and Trains) must be positioned with care to avoid crippling the movement of other units or Formations.

Mechanical Mechanics

There are quite a few mechanics in this system that go against the grain of traditional wargame fodder. All were carefully chosen to show what they are designed to show, and tempered by exhaustive testing. All contribute to my goal of giving the player an insight into this level of warfare he’s been denied until now.

Alternating Formations within the turn (as opposed to either a IGO-HUGO framework, or full-on Chit Pull) was designed to allow both sides to both have more lower level interaction than IGO-HUGO allows (with less perfect across-map coordination of your own side, and no need for special ‘inactivity’ (read: Reserve) phases and rules) yet also allow the player more input into what he wants to do (theoretically based on relative importance) than you get with completely random Chit Pull.

The order of Formation selection by default assigns some Formations a type of reserve status as they ‘wait and see’ what happens now in order to exploit the new situation later at the cost of not influencing the situation right now. Likewise, the Reactivation choice at the end of the initial Activation gives them the chance to exploit what they just did before the enemy can interfere. It

does so with a strong nod to the agility of the Formation involved as well (through the die roll needed to get it). Simple and gets the job done very well, in my opinion.

Reactivation itself allows the Formation to (maybe) do more in the turn and that “maybe” is luck driven with a probability based on the Formation’s ability to think on its feet and react rapidly to events.

The final Engagement/Attack/Barrage system for combat resolution is the result of a very long and convoluted series of trials and (mainly on my part) errors to get the best balance of playability combined with the distinguishing features of armor and infantry combat at this level.

In a brutal over-simplification this can be seen as armor spars with opponents at range (and sometimes rams straight into enemy held hexes), infantry gets in the enemy’s face a literally assaults their position, and artillery lays waste to whole areas in the hopes of inflicting losses.

Of these, artillery was the simplest—they provide a chance of inflicting step losses. There were a number of side-trips along the way (usually dealing with interdiction in various forms, all of which were subject to easy abuse and not worth the weight of rules needed to have them around).

Infantry ground assault was also pretty straight forward. We went through a lot of modifier permutations to pick the best ones to retain, adjusted the table to the point where it gave the right level of losses mixed with retreats, and it rapidly evolved toward final form.

Engagements, the interaction of AV units, their supports, and how all that boils into the final EZOC and AV EZOC rules was a long and involved affair. I’ll talk about that in the Tanks! section below.

The ‘Combat Flow Chart’ idea is best left forgotten in the dust bin of the system’s history. Suffice it to say, the road to the final form has been long. There—literally—isn’t an idea out there that wasn’t tried (sometimes multiple times) to flesh out what works best.

The essentially Odds-Free combat system and the seemingly lack of effect of step losses goes completely against the grain of wargame canon. I

can understand how those ideas will rub players raised on odds CRTs and surrounding defenders to get some coveted ratio and a linear degradation in unit strength as losses accumulate. It strikes me that **all** those ideas are deeply rooted in basic attrition-based theory of warfare (the reader should underscore that and contemplate how that affects the image of warfare games that emphasis has fed him since the very beginning). *BCS* attempts to meld maneuver and attritional warfare into their proper respective positions. Real warfare is a mix of both. I have attempted to replicate that here for you.

Let’s look at those parts in turn.

First off, surrounding the defender with stacks and, essentially, attacking him from 4 or more directions at the same time is simply impossible in real life. One could argue that all those “extra” directions are merely pinning forces (much like the assist stacks here), but if that’s the case, why do they add to the combat strength as much as the ‘real’ attackers and also why can any of them advance after combat like them? No, the design is giving the (false) impression that units at pretty much any scale form a circle around the defender and charge toward the center. This is not how things are done in real life and a fine way to generate Blue on Blue fighting. Here, if you’ve cut the enemy’s Safe Path, you won’t ensure he can’t wiggle out in a retreat—you merely ensure that he’ll take an extra loss as he works through the cloudy situation to the other side.

Odds ratios are trickier. They have their place, of course, but the rub is in how they are shown. Typically, this is done on a combat-by-combat basis where the attacker (free of enemy interference) pumps the odds up as best he can against a single perfect-intel selected point while literally ignoring any other enemy units nearby (the hoary old ‘soak off’ attack and mandatory attack requirements were attempts at mitigating this effect). The problem was that the player was doing exactly what those system’s reward: surging force ratios in a very small zone in order to obtain a maximal result from the few combats done.

That, of course, is the problem. Such massive concentrations of power are unlikely in real life simply because the desired (best) target can’t be identified properly and the resulting forces

would trip all over each other in such a small zone of attack. The example one might try to use is late-war Russian offensives that applied incredible mass to small sections of line in order to achieve a breakthrough. Key there is the business of ‘sections of line’ as the target is geographical in nature, not some specific weak German unit. Also, ‘sections of the line’ being quite large in extent—huge stretches of front by the end of the war.

In *BCS*, force ratios come into play because if you out-number the enemy locally, you can afford to build more ‘complete’ attacks across the zone, you have more power leftover to exploit the results, and can protect your forces from any counterattack potential that exists. It’s not that you do an ‘extra good job’ on ‘A’ Battalion in front of you, but you can take out ‘A’, its supports on either side, and thrust into its rear areas all at once.

Linear degradation of unit strength is another attritional chestnut. Obviously, attritional theory itself is based on the idea that you will destroy the enemy faster than you destroy yourself and, eventually, in a mindless pool of blood, ‘win.’ Losses, disruption to unit cohesion and leadership, all contribute to a unit eventually becoming combat ineffective. That’s true (and true here, too), but where the problem is in the linear nature of the business typically shown. A 5-step unit that loses one step is not 20% weaker. It’s 20% closer to *becoming* ineffective (or in our imprecise terms, dead), not 20% less of the unit it was before.

The model here follows more the one I showed in the *TCS* 25 years ago (where the combat strength was determined by the crew-manned weapons and taking out strength of the unit wouldn’t diminish firepower until the bitter end) than the one in the bit later *OCS* (where losses instantly take the shine off a unit’s offensive power and half losses reduce it defensively).

The *OCS* case is at a very different scale that you see here. One counter is usually an entire *BCS* Formation, so taking 1 *OCS* step loss (out of maybe 4) actually represents 25% of the units of the Formation becoming destroyed—as things go here, that rapidly hits on the offensive power and *number* of operations the Formation can do on the attack. By the time a Formation has lost half its units (the next layer in *OCS*), I’m pretty sure you’d say they are ‘defending at half strength’ (if

not far worse) and their offensive potential will be very limited.

In *BCS*, steps are a measure of the ‘depth’ of a unit. What damage it can take before becoming combat ineffective. They are not a direct increment of fighting strength.

It should be noted that the choice to use ‘Arty Points’ instead of the usual physical Artillery units was to keep the counter density under control, to better reflect the assignment requirements of higher level artillery units (and its natural inertia), plus to avoid the ‘games players play’ in terms of either hunting these relatively defenseless units down or using them in ahistorical functions (like convenient road blocks).

Command

The simple framework of Command as shown in *BCS* was a relatively late addition to the design process. I added it only after spending a great deal of time hammering out the movement and combat mechanics. Its need literally grew out of what I was observing in the testing of those underlying systems.

One obvious issue was that Formations were simply able to do too much and were too agile. They’d strike out in multiple directions at a time (zeroing in on weak defenders in order to advance the attritional ball by merely killing off enemy units). Even if this did not happen, players would instantly react to events as they unfolded to the degree that if the planned advance to objective X fell apart because of a botched earlier attack, objective Y was instantly substituted as if X was never contemplated. Large scale units can’t act like this—heck, *any* complicated undertaking cannot do this.

OBJ markers were the solution to that unease. Before seeing how events would unfold, the player had to make decisions on where the Formation would attempt to drive and was limited to attacking those enemy forces near those Objectives—not merely cherry-picking some weak unit that meant nothing in the bigger picture, but was simply available (according to perfect intel) to be killed.

The development of OBJs went through a series of more complex versions (usually involving route control and recon assets) to the current

fairly straight-forward level. In the end, movement routing wasn't deemed all that important as the places you could go and do something major was limited and indirectly that affects how you choose to get there (other pathways being of limited use). The more important matter was the development of an honest (and reasonably inflexible) Axis of Advance representing the Formation's current plan.

Coordination came about as a outgrowth of what was a bit more complicated rule on Passage of Lines (the name change needed because Coordination covered a number of topics that weren't technically Passage of Lines). Its development played around the edges with another difference between game thinking and real life. The player approached these rules with a mindset of 'how much can I get away with before I get punished' or trying to figure out where the line was so they could exploit it to the maximum. To an extent, players still act that way around these (and other rules), but not to the disturbing degree they did in playtesting the old Passage rules. Meanwhile, in real life, staffs routinely coordinate with adjacent formations and effort that moves from 'courtesy' to a 'major command function' depending on the degree of Passage of Lines involved. What they won't do is look at a map and figure out how close they can run an OP to the nearby unit and get away without bothering to let them know what was going on.

Coordination is a minor item if not allowed to get out of control. A DRM on SNAFU isn't the end of the world unless it gets stacked with other planning failures or affects a large number of units. Ramming a bunch of Formations into a small space is inviting all manner of confusion and not a little bit of Traffic problems.

The maneuver vs. attritional models come to a point here in the effort to smash enemy rear area installations (when you can). The benefits of clobbering a guy's lines of communication are many. You might induce logistical paralysis. This can be more efficient than simply 'attacking his units to death' in the usual wargame slugging match. These are not necessarily easy things to accomplish (especially have the player has a taste of what they feel like when done to him!), but can give bigger benefits faster than not doing so.

Players who like their attrition can indulge themselves here, too, but mastery of what maneuver can reap at this level is the best way to win. The best mix is the most effective way to play. Enjoy the swim.

Tanks!

I am greatly indebted to **Jim Stravers** who was able to share his expertise in actual armor operations with a crusty old infantryman like me even if he did end up having to use small words and a lot of crayon wax to get me to understand.

The armor model is of a greater detail than the infantry one here as, literally, armor affects the battlefield, other armor, and infantry in ways the infantry model simply cannot show. Typically, designers **do** force the armor into the infantry model and get what you'd expect—armor that behaves like really strong and fast infantry.

Armor fights other armor using the Engagement Table (i.e. by trading fires) or they can mix it up directly (using the Combat Table's Shock Attack variation). Tac MA units in general can use Shock Attacks to allow them the increased tempo their mobility creates.

How they do these jobs or if they can do them is based on one primary decision: the use of the armor in concentrated form or split up into support teams.

This takes some explaining as players frequently confuse what infantry support means. The confusion comes from thinking that being dispatched as infantry support means something like what the French did with their armor in 1940.

Strictly speaking, the French model is what happens when a player here stacks a concentrated tank unit with infantry and then pesters me wondering why he didn't get a support mod for it.

No, that's not it.

The development of effective tank-infantry teams took much of the war for the US Army. Too often the two arms would operate "near" each other, doing their own actions independently and accidently functioning as Combined Arms to a greater or (usually) lesser degree. Doing this kind of combined arms

correctly (and obtaining maximum effect) requires the arms to work together frequently so they can both learn what the other can and cannot do and requires a means of communication between the crew in the vehicle and the infantry commander on the ground (usually a telephone in the back of the tank).

Properly mixed, the resulting tank-infantry team is many times more effective than either by itself in both offense and defense, but is still limited in rapidly moving operations (because of the infantry's limited mobility unless they come equipped with their own armored vehicles).

Importantly, training and skill level is critical to obtaining these abilities.

Concentrated armor is—of course—centralized and operating as a 'herd.' As such, it cannot function with the close working relationship with infantry that happens to be around (if the tank-infantry team effects of support were allowed for Concentrated armor, we'd have the infantry working at armor speeds, which they cannot manage). Rather, Concentrated armor gives up some Combined Arms abilities so as to fully exploit the massive hammer they can wield. That is subject to terrain, of course.

While an AV EZOC may require armor to trade blows (or stop functioning in a hex), there are no *Overwatch* or *Opportunity Fire* rules to follow out at range. Well, none in terms of *literal* fires, the restrictions on HQ and Truck movement in Engagement Zones should not be ignored. A relatively enormous amount of time was expended on various ways to either show fires literally or have the ZOC and/or Engagement Zone rules 'cover' the topic of fires while the active player is moving. What you see here is the final distillation of those rules to the best balance of playability and simulation. More isn't better. We tried everything—literally—and many ideas more than once.

Beyond that, there is the matter of typical combat ranges being far less than the theoretical maximums available to the weapon system. In NW Europe, this is a matter of a lot of minor terrain (hills, trees, etc.) blocking what looks like a clear LOS on the map. In the desert matters are different.

Basically, avoiding an unplayable nightmare of excessive detail and (actually) excessive losses

meant that inactive player fires is not shown literally (but are what is going on in Stopping Engagements). Normally, they do their shooting in their own activations.

In addition to the major issues of being Concentrated or in Support, armor units are frequently faced with a decision on which of their two modes to use: effectively a 'Move Mode' and Deployed Mode. Move mode gives the unit its best map speed, lowers its AV, and provides the potential to create Traffic downstream on the map. Deployed tanks are busy dodging and weaving, so they do not move rapidly on the map at all, but do have a better AV and get the benefit of the Deployed DRM on the Engagement Table.

Of these, the latter is very important, as it shows the current thinking on 'first fires' whereby it isn't the necessarily 'best' vehicle that wins the fight as much as it is whomever gets off the first shot. That DRM may not look like much, but it has a significant effect on the result of an armor Engagement.

Deployed vs. Move also is a rough stand in for 'who's running along vs. who's looking for targets' as a gauge of who gets the first shot. It's not perfect by any stretch, but is better than trying to track movements done over previous activations!