OPERATION ANVIL/DRAGOON
OPERATION ANVIL/DRAGOON
Three days after the Anglo-American landings in North Africa, the 8th of November 1942, the Germans and Italians marched into the formerly unoccupied Vichy France. On November 27, Toulon was invested by Axis forces, and the warships of the French Navy stationed there were scuttled by their crews. The portion of Provence east of La Ciotat was occupied by the Italians, with the exception of a Wehrmacht enclave in the Toulon naval dockyard occupied by the Germans in order to enhance Axis naval operations in the Western Mediterranean.
Under the pretext of strengthening the coastal defenses against an eventual amphibious assault, the German army progressively strengthened its position in Provence and Toulon between May and August 1943. Cooperation between the German and Italian troops was never overly enthusiastic, and the armistice between the Italians and the Allies, the 8th of September 1943, ended any possibility of cooperation.
The German plan to invest Italian controlled Provence and disarm the Italian soldiery had been put in place by OKW when suspicions regarding Italian desertion of the Axis had more or less solidified after the fall of Sicily. The German plan was executed without major mishap in the evening of the 8th of September. Including Provence and parts of northern Italy, some 330,000 Italian soldiers were interned while 23,000 fled to Switzerland.
The Germans, assisted by their own Todt organization, then undertook the completion of the French coastal fortifications, which already had been strengthened by the Italians. Large naval guns were recovered from the sunken warships and emplaced to bolster the defenses. These defenses principally faced the sea and had little depth. Only Toulon had an adequate density of forts for its protection, overlooking the town from the surrounding heights. Conscious of the vulnerability of the coastal defenses east of Toulon, the German command organized a line of defenses from Hyères to the hills around La Valette, passing through La Garde and the Thouar hills.
The German Armee XIX was responsible for all of Provence. Infanteriedivision 242 arrived from Belgium and was installed in the prepared Provence defenses. It was a static division, of a type that was also encountered in Normandy at Utah beach. It lacked a reconnaissance unit, but its equipment allocation was near complete, and its troops, mainly composed of young Nazi fanatics, received 10 months of training. It was reinforced with two Armenian battalions and one Azerbaijani. It was backed up by a number of Flak units, and was positioned along the coast between Infanteriedivision 243 based between St Maxime and Menton and the Infanteriedivision 244 near Marseilles. The nearest armored division was the Panzerdivision 9, which would have to move from Montpellier to Toulon if needed. Non-military organizations such as the Reich’s working service youth (R.A.D.), Machinery operators from N.S.K.K (the service that built the coastal fortifications) and the postmen of Deutsche Reichspost Hilfe were progressively militarized and deployed for defense.
Until the Allied landing, all activity was aimed toward improvement of the fortifications and their repair when damaged by the intense allied bombardment. These air attacks were directed against the submarine support facilities, but often resulted in considerable damage to civilian coastal establishments.
Exclusively the Armenian and Azerbaidjanis units conducted operations against the Resistance.
Although OB West ordered all units of Armee groupe G to remain in place and defend the coast at any price, they were alarmed at the prospect of fighting against the expected formidable invasion force. The rising storm of Resistance sabotage and harassment unsettled the German command, which was concerned to find itself caught between the Resistance and an expected invasion.
An operation on the coast of Provence was first envisaged at the Quebec conference (11-24 August 1943). This proposed operation had to be coordinated with the main landing in the north of France planned for the spring of 1944, and had to enable the destruction of German forces between the northern "Hammer" and southern "Anvil", as the two operations were code named. At the later Cairo conference, the Allies approved Hammer, which later, of course, became known as Overlord.
Both operations were tentatively scheduled for May 1944. The Allied Force Head Quarters (AFHQ) G3 developed a plan in October to use three American divisions in Anvil, of which two would establish a bridgehead, assisted by seven French divisions (See Map at left). This led to an agreement at the Teheran conference that the major portion of the French forces, formed in the Maghreb (North Africa) and equipped with American materiel, would be used in Operation Anvil after they had proven themselves in Italy.
This decision forced the hand of the British, who were profoundly hostile to the opening of a second front in Europe, but it met the desires of the Free French liberation national committee. Responsibility for overall preparation and execution of the landing resided with the US 7th Army.
As originally envisioned, the plan saw the taking of Toulon as part of a bridgehead in the Hyères harbor, with the French arriving on D+3, and seizing both Toulon and Marseilles. The officers of Force 163 (which name was used to conceal the actual name of 7th Army and its function as headquarters for Anvil) revised the plan and displaced the landing zone to the east in order to avoid the Hyères islands and the artillery covering Toulon harbor. The plan would also profit from the small ports of Saint-Tropez and Saint-Raphaël, and from the plain of Fréjus, that could be used for the construction of airfields (See Map below).
Huge difficulties appeared in the organization, primarily because of a shortage of landing craft due to the high demands of Operation Overlord. These problems, following the difficulties encountered in Rome and Anzio in January 1944, provided an opportunity for the British to argue for the suspension of the southern landing. Intervention by Roosevelt put off any decision until the 20th of March. The British were convinced that Anvil would finally and definitively be abandoned in favor of the Italian front. However, on the 2nd of March, General Alexander Patch, who had made his name on Guadalcanal, took command of the 7th Army and proclaimed that Anvil would be the second priority of all the operations envisaged by the United States. The plan for Force 163 was then finalized and communicated to the Free French in the beginning of May.
During the Anfa conference in January 1943, Roosevelt endeavored to furnish the equipment and materiel required for eleven French divisions, and to reconstitute a modern French air arm. At the end of the first phase of this equipment program, three infantry divisions were equipped as well as part of an armored division. After the merging of the forces of General Giraud from formerly Vichy North Africa and those of General de Gaulle from Libya, the second phase (from July to August 1943) began. During this phase four infantry and two armored divisions were equipped. The third phase was suspended in November after the removal of General Giraud from the French liberation national committee, because of political reservations of Roosevelt, and because of doubts within the US military leadership regarding the ability of the French to deploy a complete expeditionary corps. Thus, the French had to accept the outfitting of a smaller number of units than had previously been planned. A compromise was finally reached that resulted in eight French divisions (including five infantry and two armored) being given priority for equipment for Anvil. In addition, a third armored division from the 2nd echelon of Overlord was assigned (this division would ultimately liberate Paris).
By the spring of 1944, the eight French divisions had been fitted with new American equipment. Four of these constituted the expeditionary corps engaged in Italy since December 1943, under the orders of General Juin. The second armored division prepared to move to Great Britain to prepare for Overlord. The remaining three were placed under General de Lattre de Tassigny, who was named commander of land forces in Corsica and North Africa. His problem was now the relationship between the French and the Americans. After long and delicate negotiations, he agreed to place the first echelon under the command of US General Patch, and would provide French reinforcements made up of French African commandos as well as a French parachute regiment. During the initial phase, General de Lattre would command the French 2nd Army Corps, (under US command), then after the French 1st Corps had joined, he would assume the position of overall commander.
The French searched for all possible methods of participation in the development of Anvil, and proposed at the beginning of May an alternative plan with a simultaneous landing of three infantry divisions and two armored groups on each side of Toulon. The Allies rejected this plan, because it divided the forces and was logistically infeasible. Nevertheless, the Americans understood the underlying message and integrated the French within Force 163 and involved them in the detailed planning of the assault.
On May 11, 1944, the Allies launched a general offensive in Italy. On 4 June, Rome was liberated and the collapse of the German front allowed many combatant units to be placed at the disposal of Force 163. Ten days later Allied Head Quarters in Italy received the order assigning 5th US Corps, composed of the 3rd, 36th and 45th US Infantry Divisions plus two divisions from French Expeditionary Corps. Nevertheless, the final decision was not yet taken on the operation itself. The British took the opportunity to propose launching the available troops against Trieste and thence onto the Hungarian plain, so as to draw in German reserves that might otherwise be sent to the western front, and thus indirectly support Overlord. The Americans in general, and Eisenhower in particular, were violently opposed to this plan of the three generals in Italy (Wilson, Alexander, and Juin - involvement of the latter being to the great displeasure of de Gaulle). The committee of Head Quarters’ Chiefs finally gained the notice of Eisenhower and, on 23 June, the final decision to execute Anvil was taken.
On 17 and 18 June the 9ème Division d'Infanterie Coloniale and a French Commando battalion landed on the island of Elba and captured it, in part to prepare for the impending landing in Provence.
The final operational plan (see map at left), allowing for the reality of limited seaborne transport capacity, foresaw the engagement of three divisions in the first wave. On June 26 the plan was passed to General Truscott, commanding 6th Corps. Final approval was granted July 2, 1944. Force 163 (renamed 7th Army) and Army B regrouped and reconstituted itself in the vicinity of Naples. On July 8, orders were passed to the sea, land and air forces. Winston Churchill made one final attempt to suspend the operation, just 10 days before D-Day, when he proposed to divert the landing force to Brittany to directly reinforce Overlord. This proposal, however, was immediately made irrelevant by the breakout of General Patton. In fact, the speed of the Allied advances now made imperative the capture of a major port for logistics support ... perhaps Marseilles.
On August 10, the decision to launch Anvil was confirmed, its name having become Dragoon in the interim for reasons of security. D-Day was scheduled for the August 15, 1944. Its principal objective was establishment of a 30km by 70km bridgehead, and was entrusted to Kodak Force - three divisions of the 5th US Army Corp reinforced by a French armored group. They were to come ashore near Cavalaire, Sainte-Maxime and Saint-Raphaël. The flanks of the landing would be screened by three commando detachments:
1st Special Service Force (Sitka Force) on the Hyères islands.
Commandos d'Afrique (Romeo Force) on Cape Negre.
Naval Assault Group of Corsica (Rosie Force) at Theoule.
The advance screen was made up of an airborne division (Rugby Force), which was to drop in the valley of the Argens, near Le Muy.
The second phase required the first echelon of French Groupe Armée B (Garbo Force) to undertake the reduction of Toulon, followed by Marseilles, after which the 5th US Army Corp would orient toward the northeast and march on Grenoble in order to cut off a German retreat. The fall of Toulon was expected on D+20 (4 September) and of Marseilles on D+40. The crossing of the Durance river was forecast for 15 October, and the final aim, the occupation of the Lyon-Bourg-en-Bresse-Chalon-Vichy area was envisaged on D+90, or about 15 November.
On August 14, at 2300 hours, the first commandos disembarked. In front of Cavalaire the Titan battery was taken without resistance; this extremely well camouflaged battery proved to be a dummy. By dawn, the beach was entirely cleared. At Port-Cros, the primary objectives were rapidly achieved, and the Vigie fort fell early in the morning after some skirmishing. The capture of the Lestissac and Eminence forts would take a further two days and require the support of naval gunfire, but no infantry reinforcement. Further to the east, the French commandos, despite some navigational errors, seized their objectives as well (batteries and strategic choke points) at the scheduled hour. On the Esterel coast, to the west of the invasion zone, a Corsican naval detachment encountered a minefield and was forced to surrender.
The airborne troops left from Italian aerodromes on the 15th of August at 0300. Despite a thick haze, 60 per cent of the paratroopers landed in their planned drop zones and another 25 per cent in close proximity. Even those who landed far from their intended drop zone served to disorient and confuse the Germans, who were unable to appreciate the true intent of the landings. The majority of the allied objectives were occupied early in the morning, and the dominant heights around Le Muy captured. The gliders, arriving the next day at about 1800 hours, were a little less fortunate because of the limited size of their landing areas and the overcrowded air space. Fifty of four hundred gliders were completely destroyed on landing, but only 125 soldiers were wounded. At dawn on August 16, the paratroopers attempted to seize Le Muy, without success. The action at Draguignan, occupied since the previous day by partisans, resulted in a series of successful attacks on German columns converging on the village. The German reinforcements were thrown into confusion and a number of prisoners taken. Overall, the airborne operation was a success. It completely paralyzed the German garrisons in the interior, and either constrained them to remain in place or flee to the north.
On August 15, the 3rd US Infantry Division landed at Cavalaire. The greatest obstacles were the minefields and barbed wire entanglements. The firebases at Le Cap and La Vigie were rapidly cleared. The amphibious tanks quickly silenced a German counterattack and the sappers set to work to clear the beaches. At 0850, seven waves went ashore and the first prisoners brought back in LCVPs. At 1040 General O'Daniel moved his headquarters ashore. The village of Cavalaire was cleared in the beginning of the afternoon and contact was made with the French commandos who were installed as a blocking force on the neck of Cape Negre. At Pampelunne, the landing was effected without incident, the heights northeast of Ramatuelle occupied and the village of Saint-Tropez discovered to already have been liberated by a group of partisans assisted by stray paratroopers. The landing was slowed by a number of minefields, but at the end of the day more than 15,000 men and 2,000 vehicles had been put ashore. Progress into the interior and toward the Maures massif started in the early afternoon, with the infantry riding in-groups on the tanks and TDs.
The 45th US Infantry Division landed at La Nartelle where enemy resistance was weak. Amphibious tanks destroyed the pillboxes; other obstacles were then rapidly cleared. The first battalions assaulting Sainte-Maxime encountered firm German resistance. The houses had to be cleared one by one by grenade, and two hours of fighting were needed before resistance ended there. Progress resumed along the coast with a link established with the 3rd Division at about 2100 hours. To the north and the interior, the landing forces took up blocking positions for the night. Despite the limited area of the beachhead 33,000 men and 3000 vehicles put ashore during the first day of the invasion.
Operations of the 36th US Infantry Division were more difficult. The first waves of the assault lost several landing craft when subjected to intense fire near Cape Antheor. On the Drammont beach, amphibious tanks were able to open the route and allow rapid occupation of the crest and coastal road. On the other hand, the elements in front of Fréjus were obliged to make an about turn due to the intensity of German fire. 93 Liberator bombers were called in to inundate the area with a deluge of high explosive. Under a violent enemy barrage, minesweepers moved in and cleared the approaches to within 500 meters of the coast. Two demolition teams disembarked and undertook the opening of passages to the beach. But facing the apparent impossibility of destroying the underwater obstacles, Admiral Lewis decided to suspend the landing and to transfer the landing to the Drammont beachhead. There was no longer any question of seizing Saint-Raphaël before nightfall. At 1030 hours, the assault forces, finally landed on the Drammont beach, moved toward Saint-Raphaël, but were stopped at the eastern boundary by a strong German blocking force at Boulouris. At 1700 hours the blocking force was bypassed and progress resumed toward Valescure. By nightfall, the heights to the northeast of Fréjus were reached. The next day, a strong attack allowed clearing Fréjus and Saint-Raphaël.
On D+1, August 16, a liaison was effected between the seaborne and airborne elements. From Cape Negre to Théoule, the bridgehead was firmly established. In the Alpha Beach zone, a German strongpoint at Cavalaire blocked all progress. French commandos engaged it from the hills on the landward side in order to outflank the coastal facing defenses. The majority of the German fortifications were cleared during the course of the day. Combat was sporadically violent at Saint-Honoré, the Gratteloup path, at Collobrières, Gonfaron, Montaud and Pierrefeu, but altogether progress was as planned and reached the Blue Line, the planned extent of the bridgehead, around 1700 hours in the evening. Brignoles was freed after the first violent actions that involved the O'Daniel division. Le Luc also was liberated at the end of the day after a sharp action that saw the involvement of armored infantry from the French 1st armored division. The heights of Le Canet were captured only after a massive US artillery bombardment. Le Muy was completely overrun that evening by the joint action of land and airborne forces. North of Saint-Raphaël, the 36th division gained a solid bridgehead and roadblocks were placed in the valley of the Argens. Bagnols-en-Forêt, Les Adrets, and Planastel were freed at the end of the evening.
Also in the evening of the August 17, D+2, the three divisions of 7th Army were solidly installed in the bridgehead and the Blue Line was reached - and in places even surpassed - everywhere on the perimeter. More than 130,000 men, 18,000 vehicles and 7,000 tons of supplies were landed. Even though the Germans anticipated the landing they were unable to block the advance of the soldiers and the US tanks. General Patch, satisfied with the development of operations, decided to move his Headquarters ashore at Saint-Tropez. At this moment, the first French troops of the 2nd echelon landed at Cavalaire and Grimaud.
At the end of the 18th of August, the allied situation could be summarized as follows:
The advance in the shape of an arch, which stretched out the deployment of the 148th and 242th German infantry divisions, resulted in their rupture at the peak of the arch near Draguignan. The German commander hastily deployed his reserves, which proved incapable of preventing exploitation by the Americans. This last was executed in two directions: while 45th Division oriented itself to the confluence of the Durance and Verdon rivers, a motorized and armored group under General Butler forced its way north.
On the coast east of the bridgehead, which up to that point had remained quiet, the 36th Division steadily drove back the German defenses towards Cannes and Grasse, which forced Kesselring to shift some troops to protect his flank in the Alps. The airborne division prepared to relieve the 36th Division in order to allow it to thrust towards the north in turn.
On the western flank, the French were nearest to the Americans at the Blue Line, positioned to relieve them and then to attack Toulon. The exploitation to the north had already commenced with violent fighting near Brignolles. The tanks of General Sudre thrust from this position to the west.
By the end of the day, the landing would be considered an unprecedented success. The exploitation phase of the battle, including the liberation of two great French Mediterranean ports, was about to begin.